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Abstract 
 
Whereas  most  research  on  remittances  focuses  on  first-generation 
migrants, the aim of this paper is to investigate the remitting behaviour 
of the host country-born children of migrants - the second generation - in 
various  European  cities.  Some  important  studies  found  that  migrant 
transnationalism is not only a phenomenon for the first generation, but 
also apply to the second and higher generations, through, among other 
things, family visits, elder care, and remittances. At the same time, the 
maintenance of a strong ethnic identity in the ‘host’ society does not 
necessarily  mean  that  second-generation  migrants  have  strong 
transnational ties to their ‘home’ country.  
 
The data used in this paper is from “The Integration of the European 
Second Generation” (TIES) project. The survey collected information on 
approximately 6,250 individuals aged 18-35 with at least one migrant 
parent  from  Morocco,  Turkey  or  former  Yugoslavia,  in  15  European 
cities, regrouped in 8 ‘countries’. For the purpose of this paper, only 
analyses for Austria (Linz and Vienna); Switzerland (Basle and Zurich); 
Germany  (Berlin  and  Frankfurt);  France  (Paris  and  Strasbourg);  the 
Netherlands  (Amsterdam  and  Rotterdam);  Spain  (Barcelona  and 
Madrid); and Sweden (Stockholm) will be presented. 
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To study the remitting behaviour of the second-generation Moroccans, 
Turks and former Yugoslavs residing in these 13 European cities, we 
will start with descriptive analyses (prevalence, amount), followed by 
logistic  (multinomial)  regression  on  the  likelihood  and  amount  of 
remittance. We are particularly interested in the following question: Are 
the  second-generation  remitters  more  driven  by  altruism  or  by  self-
interest?  If  altruism  is  the  main  driving  force,  we  can  expect  that 
‘emotional  attachment’  factors  (e.g.,  presence  of  parents  in  ‘home’ 
country, strong feelings to the country of origin or ethnic group of the 
parents,  high  intensity  of  cultural  orientation  towards  the  country  of 
origin  of  the  parents)  will  be  the  main  predictors  of  the  remitting 
behaviour, while factors like ‘investment in parents’ country of birth’ 
and ‘return intention’ will be more central if second-generation migrants 
remit for self-interested reasons.  
 
 
JEL Class.: F22, F24 
Key  words:  migration,  second  generation,    remittances,  European 
countries   5   6 
The Remittances Behaviour of the Second Generation 
in Europe: Altruism or Self-Interest? 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The connections between first-generation migrants and their households 
in  the  country  of  origin  have  been  broadly  studied  by  the  scholars 
worldwide.  Many  of  these  studies  have  focused  on  the  analysis  of 
remittances,  explaining  migrants’  transfer  behaviour.  There  is  a  close 
relationship between the evolution of the theory of migration and the 
interpretation  of  the  phenomenon  of  remittances.  The  neo-classical 
migration theory (Harris and Todaro 1970; Sjaastad 1962; Todaro 1969) 
considers migration as an individual choice in that income-maximizing 
individuals act in response to geographical differences in the supply and 
demand for labour and tends to “disregard other migration motives as 
well as migrants’ belonging to social groups such as households, families 
and communities” (De Haas 2010, p. 231). In such context, remittances 
did not find a justification. In the 1980s and 1990s, the ‘New Economics 
of  Labour  Migration’(NELM)  theory  (Stark  and  Bloom  1985;  Taylor 
1999)  rejects  the  neo-classical  model,  considering  it  as  too  rigid  to 
explain  the  determinants  of  migration.  The  NELM  theory  views 
migration not any more as an individual income-maximizing strategy, 
but as a project developed within the family context to spread income 
risks  and  to  overcome  local  market  constraints.  In  the  NELM, 
remittances  represent  the  household  strategy  to  overcome  market 
constraints and, in contrast with the neo-classical migration theory, they 
are considered as the primary objective of the decision to migrate. 
The relationships with the family in the home country represent the 
core  element  of  migratory  projects  of  the  first-generation  migrants 
(Levitt  2001),  but  the  same  cannot  automatically  be  affirmed  for  the 
second  generations.  Over  the  years,  a  number  of  ‘remittance  motives 
theories’ have been developed for the first-generation migrants, but there 
are  no  specific  theories  for  the  second  generations.  Although  some 
important studies (Leichtman 2005; Levitt 2001; Levitt and Water 2002)   7 
found  that  transnationalism  is  not  only  a  phenomenon  for  the  first 
generation, but also apply to the second and higher generations, through, 
among other things, family visits, elder care, and remittances (Baldassar 
et al. 2007; Zontini 2007), the literature on their remittance behaviour is 
still scarce. Only a few studies, mainly North American, has attempted to 
analyze  the  main  predictors  of  the  remitting  behaviour  of  second 
generations (Kasinitz et al. 2008; Lee 2007; Bautista 2009). 
In this paper, for the first time in the European context, we will 
examine second generation’s remittances behaviour. More specifically, 
we are interested in the prevalence and amount of remittances of the 
second-generation Moroccans, Turks and former Yugoslavs residing in 
various  European  cities  trying  to  answer  the  following  research 
questions: To what extent are the second-generation migrants sending 
remittances to their homeland? And what are the reasons behind their 
remitting behaviour: are the second-generation remitters more driven by 
altruism or by self-interest (Brown 1997; Cox et al. 1998; Funkhouser 
1995; Lucas and Stark 1985; Van Dalen et al. 2005)? 
 
 
2. Theoretical background  
 
The remittances literature distinguishes between an altruistic motive to 
remit,  pure  self-interest  motives,  and  intermediate  motivations:  the 
enlightened self-interest/tempered altruism. For an excellent overview of 
those theoretical models, we refer to Rapoport and Docquier (2005). 
In  the  altruistic  model  the  migrant  sends  remittances  to  the 
household members in the country of origin because s/he cares about 
them. The reasons behind the altruistic behaviour are of emotional and 
social  kind  and  are  aimed  at  improving  the  living  conditions  of  the 
family and at preserving and strengthing the ties between remitters and 
the relatives at home. According to this model there is a positive relation 
between the amount of remittances and migrant’s income and a reverse 
relation  with  the  income  of  the  household  in  the  country  of  origin 
(Durand et al. 1996; Lucas and Stark 1985; Osili 2004). Furthermore, 
altruism decreases gradually over time and with familial distance, as well   8 
as with the number of migrants in the same household (Agarwal and 
Horowitz  2002;  Funkhouser  1995).  In  the  altruism  model  there  is  a 
positive relation between the amount and the probability of remittances, 
which means that those who are more likely to receive remittances will 
receive higher amount of remittances. 
If the migrant’s behaviour is led by pure self-interest motivation, 
the remittances could be sent for three reasons. First, remitting behaviour 
can be driven by the aspiration of inheritance. In the case of the bequest 
motivation, the migrant sends remittances in order to strengthen his/her 
reputation at home and to assure an important role  within the family 
hierarchy.  Hence,  the  higher  the  assets  to  inherit  and  the  higher  the 
migrant’s  income,  the  greater  the  amount  of  remittances  sent  (De  la 
Briere  et  al.  1997;  Hoddinott  1994;  Osili  2004;  Schrieder  and  Knerr 
2000). Furthermore, remittances are expected to be strongly related to 
the probability to inherit and hence, to be negatively related to the degree 
of risk aversion and familial distance and to have an inversely U shape 
relation  with  the  number  of  migrants  in  the  same  household  (heirs): 
sharing the inheritance with other migrants  means higher competition 
which  could  increase  the  migrant’s  remittances,  but  the  likelihood  of 
inheriting is smaller with an increasing number of heirs and this could 
decrease remittances. 
Second, migrants (usually temporary migrants) could remit money 
for  an  exchange  motivation:  for  investing  in  assets  in  the  country  of 
origin, or providing for their maintenance and the relatives left behind 
could  represent  the  agent  (Garip  2006);  for  paying  for  the  services 
provided by the family at home such as caring of the children left behind 
(Cox  1987;  Cox  et  al.  1998).  According  to  this  model  remittances 
increase with migrant’s income and either decrease or increase with the 
household’s  income  (which  is  a  proxy  for  the  services’  prices), 
depending  on  the  elasticity  of  migrant’s  demand  for  the  services 
provided. If the migrant’s demand is elastic, it means that s/he will ask 
for fewer services and so remittances will decrease; if his/her demand is 
inelastic, on the other hand, the migrant will ask the same services but at 
a higher price, resulting in more remittances. The latter, however, is an 
important prediction of the exchange motivation, because it allows to   9 
discriminate between exchange and altruistic behaviour (Rapoport and 
Docquier  2005).  Another  remarkable  prediction  of  this  model  is  the 
negative relation between remittances and the migrant’s education, since 
the exchange motivations are typical for temporary migrants, whereas 
the more educated migrants are expected to have lower propensity to 
return.  
The third pure self-interest model is the strategic one (Stark 1995). 
The reasons behind remittances are the result of a strategic behaviour of 
the  high  skilled  workers,  who  want  protect  their  wages  from  being 
depressed  by  the  presence  of low  skilled  migrants. According to  this 
model the migrants’ wages are based on the average productivity of the 
pool  of  migrants  to  which  they  belong,  because  of  the  lack  of 
information about individual skill levels, which unable the employers at 
the destination country to distinguish among workers in term of their 
productivity.  For  this  reason  skilled  migrants  may  have  incentives  to 
dissuade the unskilled from migrating, and thus send remittances. The 
strategic model predicts that remittances increase with migrant’s income 
and education and decrease with household income, since the strategic 
behaviour aims at reducing the main incentive to migration, represented 
by  the  wage  differentials  between  the  two  countries.  Furthermore, 
remittances are expected to decrease over time because the high skilled 
workers’ skills will increasingly be noticed and valued by employers at 
the destination. 
 
One of the difficulties in testing both theories - altruism and self-interest 
-  is  that  it  is  hard  to  discriminate  motivations  derived  from  the  two 
alternative models of remittances behaviour, because remittances tend to 
combine a diverse set of factors and reasons. Besides altruism and self-
interest may coexist, some of their predictors overlap. Lucas and Stark 
(1985, p. 904) affirm that “In the end one cannot probe whether the true 
motive is one of caring or more selfishly wishing to enhance prestige by 
being perceived as caring”. But the two authors suggest a test in order to 
distinguish  the  self-interest  motivation  from  the  altruistic  one:  if  the 
remittance  behaviour  is affected  by  a strong bargaining power  of the 
household (for example by the sanctions against migrants), it does not fit   10 
with  the  altruistic  model.  Thus  the  prediction  is  that  the  greater  the 
household’s wealth in the country of origin, the higher its bargaining 
power  and  the  higher  the  amount  of  remittances  sent  by  migrants. 
Whereas  the  prediction  of  the  altruistic  model  is  the  reverse:  higher 
amount  of  remittances  flows  to  poorer  households  (Lucas  and  Stark 
1985; Stark and Lucas 1988).  
These two extreme motivations (altruism and pure self-interest) do 
not fully explain the migrants’ remittance behaviour. Lucas and Stark 
(1985) elaborated an intermediate model in order to better explain the 
motivation to remit: the enlightened self-interest, (or tempered altruism), 
that  represent  an  inter-temporal,  mutually  beneficial,  contractual 
arrangement between migrants and their households in the country of 
origin (Gubert 2002; Lucas and Stark 1985; Poirine 1997). According to 
this model remittances could satisfy both the interest of migrants and 
their  families  left  behind.  The  two  basic  elements  of  this  contractual 
arrangement are investment and risk. 
In the investment case, remittances might constitute the repayment 
with interest of the migration costs or the cost of migrant’s education 
(Hoddinott 1994; Ilahi and Jafarey  1999; Poirine 1997). A household 
finances a potential emigrant’s education, which allows him/her to find a 
better paid job abroad. The aim of such family contract is to increase 
income rather than reduce uncertainty. The family’s receipts rise with 
geographical  distance  and  migrant’s  education:  the  further  away  the 
country of origin and the higher the education completed, the higher the 
costs made by the household and hence, the more remittances will be 
transferred.  With  regard  to  the  educational  effect,  it  is  difficult  to 
discriminate between this model and the altruistic and pure self-interest 
ones, because both the altruistic and pure self-interest behaviours also 
predict a positive relation between remittances and migrant’s income and 
so education. Nevertheless, Lucas and Stark (1985) suggest that in the 
investment model the effect of education on the amount (and probability) 
of  remittances  should  be  higher  among  the  close  relatives  of  the 
household  such  as  for  the  children  of  the  head  (familial  distance). 
Another  interesting  prediction  of  this  model  is  the  inverse-U  relation 
between  remittances  and  the  household’s  income,  since  migration  is   11 
constrained  by  liquidity  and  the  family  wealth  enable  to  finance 
migration; for higher value of family wealth migration is unconstrained 
and the relation between remittances and family income is decreasing. 
Remittances could also represent a common household risk reducing and 
diversification  strategy  in  less  developed  countries,  where  the  capital 
market and the insurance system are incomplete. In particular households 
in rural context allocate one or more members of the family to a non-
correlated labour market (an urban area for example), not to maximize 
the income, but rather to minimize the risk of worsening of the economic 
and  social  conditions  of  the  family  at  home.  The  risks  are  insured 
through remittances. Contrary to the other models, remittances are not 
dependent on either the migrant’s or household’s income, but they are 
more  likely  to  occur  when  income  at  origin  is  more  volatile  and  the 
household holds sizeable, and thereby more risky assets. At the same 
time, the household supports the migrant by paying costs of migration or 
during  the  initial  job  search  or  spells  of  unemployment.  Although 
remittances as an answer to families’ shocks could also be consistent 
with the altruistic model, there is a basic difference between the two 
models, represented by the timing variable: according to the altruistic 
behaviour remittances decrease gradually over time, whereas in the co-
insurance  model  remittances  are  sent  on  a  relatively  irregular  basis, 
without decrease during a given period (if specified in the contract) and 
with  a  sharp  decline  after  a  while  (after  the  end  of  the  contractual 
obligation). 
Both the investment and risk agreements are self-reinforced thanks 
to the simultaneous coexistence of altruism and (one of the three types 
of) self-interest motivations. The aspiration of the migrant to inherit, to 
invest in assets, or to return, means that s/he has a vested interest in the 
home  country.  Therefore,  the  self-interest  can  prevent  migrant  from 
defaulting. Moreover, the family may possess sanctions that can be used 
to control the behaviour of their migrant members like depriving them 
from their rights to inherit, to future family solidarity, or the right to 
return, and hence, to secure remittances (Lucas and Stark 1985). 
 
   12 
 
3. Linking second generations to remittances 
 
Research on remittances behaviour of second generation’s migrants is 
still limited. As yet, there are relatively few studies analyzing the main 
determinants  of  second  generation  remittances.  Those  studies  are 
predominantly North American and focus on a particular community, or 
on  the  comparison  between  communities,  or  between  generations.  
Furthermore,  the  remittances  behaviour  of  second  generations  is  not 
analyzed  independently  but  in  a  comparison  to  the  first-generation 
migrants. For example in her study on Tongans community in Australia, 
Helen  Lee  (2007)  found  that  the  transnational  ties  of  the  second 
generation were not as strong as those of their parents; they were less 
likely to remit and if they did, they sent less money compared to their 
parents.  Only  a  small  share  of  Tongans’  second  generation  had  sent 
remittances to Tonga, with females that were more likely to remit than 
their male  counterparts, and the main determinant of remittances was 
represented  by  parents’  pressure,  or  by  the  presence  of  relatives  in 
Tonga.  Other  factors  supposed  to  foster  transnational  ties  such  as 
frequent visit to Tonga and the degree of attachment to the parents’ home 
country, had no direct influence on remittance’s behaviour. 
In  the  case  of  Filipinos  in  the  United  States,  Jennifer  Bautista 
(2009) looked at potential gender differences in the intention to remit 
among  second  generation,  comparing  first  generation’s  practice  and 
second generation’s intention to remit. She found that almost all second-
generation  Filipino  were  willing  to  remit  in  the  future,  regardless  of 
gender, in order to perpetrate the parents’ tradition of remitting, even if 
they never visited the Philippines, neither they spoke the language. In 
conclusion,  the  emotional  and  cultural  ties  to  the  parents’  homeland 
seem to be the main predictors of the willingness to remit, bearing in 
mind  that  in  the  Filipino  migrants’  tradition,  remittances  have  an 
important  economic  and  social  role  (Clark  and  Drinkwater  2007; 
Menjivar et al. 1998). 
Another  study  that  shows  the  importance  of  second  generation 
remittances  have  come  from  a  survey  in  the  New  York  metropolitan   13 
area. Kasinitz et al. (2008) focused on second generation’s transnational 
activities,  including  remittances,  analyzing  the  differences  in  the 
likelihood to remit among first and second-generation migrants. Their 
results show that the second generation were less likely to send money 
back to their parents’ homeland, compared to the first generation, and 
that the remittances behaviour varied across different communities. The 
lower remittance activity among second generation was attributed by the 
authors to both the young age of the respondents – in the future they 
would probably have send  more  money – and the low level of other 
transnational activities compared to their parents.  
The  question  whether  transnationalism  is  only  a  phenomenon 
among first-generation migrants or also applies to second generation is 
controversial. Gans (1997) shows that transnational ties decrease because 
of increasing assimilation process over generations, assuming a negative 
association  between  transnationalism  and  integration  in  the  ‘host’ 
society,  meaning  that  the  stronger  the  integration  the  lesser  the 
maintenance of transnational ties. On the contrary, Foner (2002) writes 
that  the  second  generation  will  be  more  engaged  in  transnational 
practices than the first one. Other scholars (Portes et al. 1999; Guarnizo 
et al. 2003) consider transnational ties and integration as complementary 
and  not  as  mutual  exclusive,  particularly  in  the  case  of  economic 
integration:  economically  integrated  individuals  dispose  of  increased 
cognitive and financial capacity for maintaining transnational ties. 
At the same time, the maintenance of a strong ethnic identity in the 
‘host’ society does not necessarily mean that second-generation migrants 
have strong transnational ties to their ‘home’ country (Vickerman 2002). 
Hence, many scholars of the second generation try to distinguish more 
accurately the actual involvement in transnational relations, compared to 
processes of ethnic identification that could be purely in symbolic terms 
(for  example  the  ‘emotional  transnationalism’  –  Wolf  2002),  without 
reference  to  specific  forms  of  transnational  activities  (Kasinitz  et  al. 
2002; Louie 2006). Levitt et al. (2003) differentiate a “comprehensive” 
transnationalism  from  a  “selective”  one,  in  order  to  distinguish 
individuals who retain intensive transnational activities from those who 
have periodic or occasional ties with the country of origin.    14 
Largely building on the work of Rapoport and Docquier (2005), Table 1 
presents  the  expected  effects  of  the  main  explanatory  variables  on 
remittances  according  to  the  ‘remittance  motives  theories’  described 
above.  However,  as  these  theories  were  developed  for  the  first-
generation migrants, several theoretical underpinnings are not predicated 
in  the  case  of  second  generation’s  remittances  behaviour.  This  in 
particular holds for the two enlightened self-interest/tempered altruism 
models.  In  these  models,  the  direct  link  between  remittances  and 
family’s costs of education and subsequent migration is central, which is 
difficult to transform to the second generation: they attend school in the 
‘host’ country and it is highly unlikely that the contractual agreement 
between  their  parents  and  family  transfers  across  generations. 
Consequently,  we  will  restrict  our  attention  to  test  the  effects  of  the 
variables predicted by the altruism and pure self-interest models, with 
the exception of the effect of the households’ socioeconomic status as 
relevant information is missing. Our main purpose in this article is to test 
whether  the  remitting  behaviour  of  second-generation  migrants  in 
Europe is more driven by altruism or by self-interest.  
We hypothesize that the theoretical reasoning and related expected 
effects of the altruism and pure self-interest models might also hold for 
the second-generation migrants: they may send remittances as an act of 
mere generosity without any kind of commitment or obligation to the 
relatives or friends in their parent’s home country; their behaviour could 
be  led  by  selfish  motivation  in  order  to  enlarge  the  likelihood  of 
inheritance, to reimburse those who take care of their investments and 
assets  in  the  country  of  ‘origin’,  or  to  facilitate  their  intention  to 
‘return’
§.  So  we  will  examine  whether  the  effects  of  respondent’s 
characteristics are in the predicted direction of the altruism and/or pure 
self-interest models outlined in the highlightened part of Table 1. 
Several other new factors, not considered by the above mentioned 
theories, can be expected to be less or not important in case of “altruism” 
                                                 
§ Strictly speaking, it is not a return – they are born and raised in Europe – but a move to their parents’ country of 
birth. For protagonists themselves, however, it is an ontological sense of return to a point of origin, their ethnic 
homeland (King and Christou 2010). Therefore, and for the sake of simplicity, we use the term return throughout this 
article.   15 
motives,  while  they  are  important  in  case  of  “self-interest”  and  vice 
versa. For example, “emotional attachment” factors (e.g., strong feelings 
to  the  country  of  origin  or  ethnic  group,  high  intensity  of  cultural 
orientation  towards  the  country  of  origin)  are  expected  to  be  main 
predictors  of  the  altruistic  motivation.  On  the  other  hand,  “economic 
attachment” and return-related factors
** (e.g., investment and assets at 
home, dissatisfaction with the level of equal treatment in the educational 
system and in the labour market) will be more strongly related to the 
self-interest motivation to remit. 
 
 
Table  1.  Summary  of  the  predicted  effects  of  several  explanatory  variables  on 
remittances
††  
     
  Altruistic  Pure self-interest  Enlightened self-interest/ 
tempered altruism 
    Inheritance  Exchange 
 
Strategic 
motive 
Investment  Risk/Co-insurance 
Household’s socio-
economic status 
-  +  + (but - in case of 
inelastic demand) 
0  ∩   0 
Immigrant’s socio-
economic status 
+  +  + (but - in case of 
education) 
+  +  0 
Number of migrants 
in the same household 
-  ∩ 
 
0  0  0  0 
Distance  - (familial)  - (familial)  0  0  + ( geographical) 
 
0 
Time  - (linear)  0  0  -  0  0 (but sharp 
decline after the 
end of the 
contractural 
obligation) 
Emotional attachment 
(excl. close family) 
+  0  0  0  +  + 
Economic attachment 0  0  +     0  +  + 
Return-related factors 0  0  +     0  +  + 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
** The literature on the second generation‘s transnationalism focuses also on the “roots migration” describing the 
migration of the second generation to the parents’ homeland (Levitt 2009; Wessendorf 2007). 
†† The different colours make distinction between expectations based on classical theories and our three additional 
expected effects   16 
4. Data and Measurements 
 
To test our hypotheses, we use survey data from “The Integration of the 
European  Second  Generation”  (TIES)  project,  a  collaborative  and 
comparative  research  project  on  the  lives  of  second-generation 
individuals  of  Turkish,  Moroccan  and  former  Yugoslavian  descent  in 
several  cities  across  Europe.
‡‡  The  survey,  conducted  in  2007-2008, 
collected information on 9,771 individuals aged 18-35, including 3,750 
persons belonging to a ‘native’ control group. The countries and cities 
were selected on the extent of ethno-racial segregation and on the basis 
of contrasting immigration, naturalization and integration policies so that 
respondents would reflect a wide spectrum in policy contexts. In this 
article,  analyses  for  cities  in  Austria  (Vienna  and  Linz),  Switzerland 
(Zurich and Basle), Germany (Berlin and Frankfurt), France (Paris and 
Strasburg), Spain (Barcelona and Madrid), the Netherlands (Amsterdam 
and Rotterdam), and Sweden (Stockholm) are presented.
§§ In those cities, 
an identical questionnaire was used, which made it possible to pool the 
data  sets.  The  pooled  multinational  sample  is  reduced  to  N=3,765 
(prevalence  remittances)  and  3,690  (amount  of  remittances), 
respectively, due to the exclusion of the ‘native’ individuals and missing 
values on relevant variables. 
 
Dependent variables  
Respondents were asked whether they have sent money to the country of 
birth  of  their  parents  in  the  last  five  years  and  if  so,  how  much 
approximately per year, with the response categories: (1) less than 500 
                                                 
‡‡ The TIES project is coordinated by Maurice Crul and Jens Schneider, both of whom are affiliated with the Institute 
for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES) of the University of Amsterdam in the Netherlands. The survey was carried 
out by survey bureaus under supervision of the nine national TIES partner institutes: IMES and the Netherlands 
Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI) in the Netherlands; the Institute for Social and Political Opinion 
Research (ISPO) of the University of Leuven in Belgium; the National Institute for Demographic Studies (INED) in 
France; the Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies (SFM) of the University of Neuchâtel in Switzerland; 
the Centre for Research in International Migration and Ethnic Relations (CEIFO) of the University of Stockholm in 
Sweden; the Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies (IMIS) of the University of Osnabrück in 
Germany; the Institute for the Study of Migration (IEM) of the Pontifical Comillas University of Madrid in Spain; 
and the Institute for European Integration Research (EIF) of the Austrian Academy of Sciences in Austria. For 
further information on the TIES project and country documentation, see www.tiesproject.eu.  
§§ For reasons of differences in the questionnaire design and restricted access to the data, the Belgium cities Brussels 
and Antwerp are excluded.   17 
Euros, (2) 500-1000 Euros, (3) 1000-2000 Euros, and (4) more than 2000 
Euros. Based on this information, two variables were created: a dummy 
variable whether the person did send remittances (0=no, 1=yes) and a 
categorical variable representing the amount of remittances, with three 
values, 0=no remittances, 1=less than 500 Euros, and 2=500 or more 
Euros. 
 
Independent variables  
Four variables refer to immigrant’s socio-economic status: (1) perceived 
difficulties  with  current  income,  running  from  0=great  difficulties  to 
4=comfortable; (2) educational attainment, reflecting the highest level of 
education the respondents had completed by obtaining a qualification or 
diploma, harmonised across countries
***, ranging from 1= no school or 
primary school to 5=completion of tertiary school; (3) whether or not 
being  currently  employed  (0=no,  1=yes);  and  (4)  current  or  last 
occupational  attainment,  coded  according  to  the  International  Socio-
Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI; Ganzeboom & Treiman, 
1996) of occupational status, running from 16 (e.g., domestic workers, 
cleaners  and  launderers,  agricultural  and  fishery  labourers)  to  88 
(medical doctors), with the mean ISEI score by immigrant group, gender, 
and country of residence for those who never had worked. 
The  number  of  migrants  in  the  same  household  is  measured  by  the 
number of siblings and its square to test whether the effect is non-linear, 
inverse U-shaped effect. 
Presence of parents abroad (0=no, 1=yes) is the only opposite indicator 
we could include for familial distance. 
Respondent’s age (in years) is the proxy for time. 
Eight  variables  refer  to  emotional  attachments:  (1)  feelings  of 
belonging to parents’ home country, ranging from 0=very weak/not at all 
to 4=very strong; (2) watching TV-channels from parents’ home country, 
running  from  0=never  to  3=exclusively;  (3)  use  of  internet  for 
information  about  parents’  home  country  (0=no,  1=yes);  (4)  use  of 
ethnic  language  in  family  setting,  running  from  0=always  using  the 
                                                 
*** To make educational attainment comparable across countries, national educational system qualifications were 
transformed into UNESCO’s ISCED categories (Schneider, 2008).   18 
language of parents’ country of origin to 1=always using the language of 
the country of residence
†††; (5) participation in organisations of ethnic 
signature  (0=no,  1=yes)
‡‡‡;  (6)  co-ethnic  friendship,  representing  the 
number of co-ethnic friends amongst the three best friends (score: 0-3); 
(7) partner status, comparing those having a first- or second-generation 
partner (0=no, 1=yes) with those having a partner of another ethnicity 
(including ‘native’ partner) or no partner; and (8) whether or not visiting 
parents’  home  country  for  family  reasons  during  the  last  five  years 
(0=no, 1=yes). 
Economic attachment is measured by the variable investment, i.e, 
whether or not the individual invested money in business or real estate in 
the  past  five  years  to  parents’  home  country  (0=no,  1=yes).  Three 
variables refer to return-related variables: (1) return migration intention 
is  measured by the question: ‘Do you intend to live in your parent’s 
country of birth in the future for a period of one year or longer?’ with the 
response categories running from 0=certainly not to 3=certainly. (2) level 
of satisfaction with career, with three categories, 1=better than expected 
(reference  group),  2=worse  than  expected,  and  3=far  worse  than 
expected; and (3) extent of satisfaction with level of education, ranging 
from 0=completely dissatisfied to 4=completely satisfied. The last two 
variables  measure  subjective  elements  of  one’s  structural  integration. 
They were included as return-related factors because of their link with 
the failure-success binary of the migrant’s strategies (Heckmann 2005). 
The  direction  of  their  effects,  however,  cannot  be  predicted  a  priori. 
According  to  the  neoclassical  approach,  return  migration  is  mainly 
interpreted  as  the  result  of  an  integration  failure  in  the  host  country; 
migrants  who  feel  that  they  failed  to  improve  their  lives  in  the  host 
county  are  more  likely  to  return.  The  New  Economics  of  Labour 
Migration, on the other hand, consider return migration as the outcome 
of success; returnees are those who had achieved their goals. 
                                                 
††† The respondents were asked which language they use, if applicable, with their siblings, mother, father, and 
current/last partner. The response categories ranged from “mostly the language of parents’ country of origin” to 
“mostly the language of the country of residence”. The scores on these four items were converted into one summary 
scale, reflecting the degree of use of ethnic language in family setting. 
‡‡‡ A list of organisations was presented to the respondents. After indicating whether or not they had participated in 
each organisation in the past year, they were asked in which of these organisations the activities are mostly oriented 
towards the ethnic community.   19 
Finally,  several  (socio-demographic)  characteristics  that  are  generally 
known to have an effect on remitting behaviour were included as control 
variables in the analyses. The first one is gender, with man being the 
reference  group.  Another  variable  controlled  for  is  religiosity,  a 
constructed variable based on four items of religious behaviour (fasting, 
eating  halal  food,  daily  prayer,  and  visiting  the  mosque)  and  self-
identifying as Muslim, comparing those who were “no Muslim at all” 
(“never” on the four items on religious behaviour and not identifying 
themselves as Muslim) with “strict Muslim” (fasting, eating halal food, 
daily prayer and visiting the mosque “most of the time” or “always”), 
“social Muslim” (only fasting and eating halal food “most of the time” or 
“always”; one or both of the other two items on religious behaviour less 
often), “symbolic Muslim” (one or more of the four items on religious 
behaviour less often), and “identificational Muslim” (“never” on the four 
items on religious behaviour but they identified themselves as Muslim). 
Clark and Drinkwater (2001: 23) argued that religiosity is of importance 
in  the  remitting  behaviour:  they  explained  differences  in  remitting 
behaviour among ethnic group through religious affiliation, stressing that 
Islam  emphasise  “brotherhood  across  international  frontiers”. 
Furthermore, the immigrant group variable was included, indicating the 
members  of  our  target  groups  and  differentiates  between  the  second-
generation Turks (reference group), Moroccans and former Yugoslavs. 
To  examine  whether  remitting  depends  on  the  geographic  distance 
between ‘host’ and ‘home’ country the variable geographical distance 
(between the current city of residence and the biggest city in parents’ 
home country, in kilometres) was created. Finally, to examine whether 
remitting  varies  across  different  policy  regimes,  the  dummy  variable 
multicultural policies, distinguishing the participating countries with a 
more multicultural approach (Sweden, the Netherlands) from those with 
a  more  exclusionist  or  assimilationist  approach  (Austria,  Germany, 
France, Spain, Switzerland), was created. 
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5. Results 
 
With regard to the first research question – to what extent are the second-
generation migrants sending remittances to their homeland – we find that 
around 19% of the immigrants in our sample remit; 9% remits less than 
500 Euros, whereas 8% remit more than 500 Euros. 
In  order  to  identify  the  variables  that  best  predicted  the  remitting 
behaviour  of  second-generation  migrants  in  Europe,  and  particular 
whether  remitting  was  more  driven  by  altruism  or  by  self-interest, 
(multinomial)  logit  regression  analyses  were  carried  out.  For  ease  of 
interpretation,  the  results  are reported in odds  ratios  (prevalence) and 
marginal effects (amount of remittances)
§§§, respectively. Tables 2 and 3 
present the results of these analyses. 
 
 
Table 2. Effects (odds ratios) of variables on likelihood of sending remittances among second-
generation migrants in selected TIES-cities (N=3,765) 
 
Model:
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
Control variables         
Man  1.11  1.06  1.26*  1.05  1.07 
Type of Muslim (ref. no Muslim at all):               
  Strict Muslim  2.02***  2.53***  0.98  1.62**  1.03 
  Social Muslim  2.43***  3.09***  1.25  2.08***  1.41* 
  Symbolic Muslim  1.80***  2.05***  1.22  1.58***  1.25 
  Identificational Muslim  1.54  1.67*  1.14  1.47  1.21 
Immigrant group (ref. Turks)         
  Moroccans  0.69*  0.67*  1.03  0.68**  0.94 
  (Former) Yugoslavs  2.36***  2.36***  2.21***  2.41***  2.32*** 
Geographical distance  1.00***  1.00***  1.00***  1.00***  1.00*** 
Multicultural (versus DE/A)  1.09  1.03  1.14  1.12 1.13 
         
Immigrant’s socio-economic status         
Perceived difficulties with income    1.09    1.05 
Educational attainment    1.01      1.01 
Employed    1.52***      1.66*** 
Occupational attainment    1.00        1.00 
         
Number of migrants in the same household         
Number of siblings    1.05    1.00 
Number of siblings-square    1.00    1.00 
                                                 
§§§ The marginal effect gives the change in probability by one unit change in an explanatory variable when all other 
variables are held constant at sample mean values. For example, the marginal effect for a dummy variable is the 
difference between being in Category 1 and being in Category 0. Per variable the marginal effects sum up to zero.   21 
         
Familial distance         
Parents abroad    2.72***    2.58*** 
         
Time         
Age    1.08***      1.05*** 
         
Emotional attachment (excl. close family)         
Feelings of belonging to parents’ home country      1.05  1.06 
Watching TV-channels from parents’ home country      1.15*  1.14* 
Use of internet for information about parents’ home 
country 
    1.55***  1.47** 
Use of ethnic language in family setting      1.64**  1.37 
Participation in organisations of ethnic signature      1.62***  1.55*** 
Co-ethnic friendship      1.01  1.07 
Partner (ref. native or no partner)         
  First-generation partner    3.42***  2.28*** 
  Second-generation partner    1.67**  1.25 
Visiting parents’ home country for family reasons      1.74***    1.68*** 
           
Economic attachment and return-related factors                
Investment        11.29***  7.88*** 
Return migration intention        1.14***  1.12** 
Satisfaction with career:               
  Far worse than expected        1.49**  1.51* 
  Worse than expected        1.08  0.94 
Satisfaction with level of education        1.08*  1.08* 
               
Pseudo R²  0.04  0.09  0.11  0.11  0.19 
*** p <  .001;  ** p <  .01;  * p <  .05 
 
With  regard  to  the  likelihood  of  remitting,  we  ran  5  different 
models. In Model 1, the control variables were included. Model 2 also 
incorporated  respondent’s  socio-economic  status  variables  (perceived 
income,  educational  attainment,  employed,  occupational  attainment), 
with an expected positive effect according to both the altruism and self-
interest theories (though a negative effect of education according to the 
exchange model), and ‘number of siblings’, ‘presence of parents abroad’ 
and ‘age’ with a different expected effect between remittance motives 
models in question. In the next two models, besides the control variables, 
the variables capturing emotional attachment (Model 3) and economic 
attachment and return-related factors (Model 4), respectively, were taken 
into account. As mentioned above, these variables are new elements in 
order to shed  more light on the dominance of each type of remitting 
motive: emotional attachments are expected to be main predictors in case   22 
of  altruism  motives,  while  economic  attachment  and  return-related 
factors are more in line with pure self-interest behaviour. In the final 
model (Model 5), all variables were included. 
When  only  the  control  variables  are  considered  (Model  1), 
religiosity  (indicated  by  respondent’s  type  of  Muslim)  influenced 
whether  or  not  s/he  did  remit.  So-called  strict,  social  and  symbolic 
Muslims  were  more  likely  to  remit  than  non-Muslims;  no  significant 
difference  in  remitting  was  found  between  the  latter  and  those 
identifying  themselves  as  Muslim  but  not  following  Islamic  rules. 
Gender had no effect on the likelihood of remitting. Second-generation 
migrants of (former) Yugoslavia origins were more likely to remit than 
those of Turkish origin, whereas Moroccan second-generation migrants 
had a lower likelihood of remitting. Geographical distance had a clear 
positive  effect:  the  longer  the  distance,  the  more  likely  to  send 
remittances.  The  integration  policies  of  respondent’s  country  of 
residence had no effect. 
Model  2  partially  confirms  the  expected  positive  effect  of 
immigrant’s socio-economic status according to both the altruism and 
pure self-interest  models. Being employed increased the  likelihood to 
remit  although  the  occupational  level  had  no  additional  effect. 
Educational  attainment  did  not  substantially  influence  one’s  remitting 
behaviour  as  well;  neither  a  negative  (as  expected  by  the  exchange 
model) nor a positive effect (expected by the other models) was found. 
In addition, having no problems to make end meet did not increase the 
likelihood of remitting. The number of siblings and its square did not 
affect the likelihood to remit, which is contrary to the expectations of the 
altruism  and  inheritance  models  but  in  line  with  the  exchange  and 
strategic models. The presence of parents abroad, as opposite indicator of 
familial distance, enormously increased the likelihood to remit, an effect 
which  has  been  raised  by  both  the  altruism  and  inheritance  model. 
Contrary  to  all  remittance  motives  models,  the  likelihood  to  send 
remittances increased with age. 
In line with the altruism model, emotional attachment substantially 
affected  the  likelihood  to  remit.  Respondents  who  more  often  were 
watching  TV-channels  from  parents’  home  country,  using  the  ethnic   23 
language  in  family  setting,  visiting  parents’  home  country  for  family 
reasons or participating in organisations of ethnic signature as well as 
those having a first- or second-generation partner, were more likely to 
send remittances. No positive effect, however, was found on feelings of 
belonging to parents’ home country and co-ethnic friendship. Once we 
accounted  for  respondents’  degree  of  emotional  attachment,  the 
previously  observed  differences  in  remitting  behaviour  by  type  of 
Muslim become insignificant, indicating that the greater likelihood of 
remitting among those second-generation migrants following of Islamic 
rules was largely attributable to their stronger emotional attachment with 
parent’s country of birth. Emotional attachment seems also to be gender-
related as in Model 3 a significantly higher likelihood of remitting was 
found for men. 
Model 4 shows that the investment and return-related variables also 
had  a  significant  positive  effect  up  remitting  behaviour,  which  is 
accordance with the exchange model. Respondents who had invested in 
parent’s  country  or  origin,  who  expressed  a  return  intention,  whose 
career  was  far  worse  than  expected,  as  well  as  those  who  were 
dissatisfied  with  their  level  of  education,  were  more  likely  to  remit. 
Endogeneity is likely to play a role between remittances and investments 
because a part of the money send to the homeland through remittances 
could be used for investment. Looking at the direction of the effects of 
educational and occupational satisfaction, our findings better fit with the 
neoclassical  theory  on  return  migration,  that  interprets  return  as  an 
integration failure. After data on these variables have been included, no 
striking  changes  were  found  in  the  effects  of  the  control  variables 
compared to Model 1.  
In the final model (Model 5), all independent variables were taken 
into  account.  Most  of  the  variables  remain  significant.  Besides  the 
change of the type-of-Muslim effect into insignificance (attributable to 
the association with emotional attachment, as notified before), the only 
exceptions are: use of ethnic language, and having a second-generation 
partner.  
 
   24 
Table 3. Multinomial effects of variables on amount of remittances send by second-generation 
migrants in selected TIES-cities (N=3,690) 
 
 
No remittances  Less than 500 euros  500 or more euros 
Control variables     
Man  -0.00  -0.01  0.01 
Type of Muslim (ref. no Muslim at all):       
  Strict Muslim  -0.00  0.01  -0.01 
  Social Muslim  -0.05*  0.05*  0.00 
  Symbolic Muslim  -0.03  0.03*  0.00 
  Identificational Muslim  -0.02  0.02  0.00 
Immigrant group (ref. Turks)       
  Moroccans  0.02  -0.01  -0.01 
  (Former) Yugoslavs  -0.10**  0.04  0.06** 
Geographical distance  -0.00***  0.00***  0.00** 
Multicultural (versus DE/A)  -0.01  0.03*  -0.02* 
       
Immigrant’s socio-economic status       
Perceived difficulties with income  -0.01  0.00  0.01 
Educational attainment  -0.00  0.01  -0.00 
Employed  -0.05***  0.04***  0.02** 
Occupational attainment  0.00  -0.00  0.00 
       
Number of migrants in the same household       
Number of siblings  -0.00  0.00  -0.00 
Number of siblings-square  -0.00  -0.00  0.00 
       
Familial distance       
Parents abroad  -0.11***  0.06**  0.05** 
       
Time       
Age  -0.00***  0.00  0.00** 
       
Emotional attachment (excl. close family)       
Feelings of belonging to parents’ home country  -0.00  -0.00  0.01 
Watching TV-channels from parents’ home country  -0.01*  0.01  0.01 
Use of internet for information about parents’ home 
country 
-0.05**  0.01  0.04*** 
Use of ethnic language in family setting  -0.04*  0.02  0.02 
Participation in organisations of ethnic signature  -0.05***  0.03**  0.02* 
Co-ethnic friendship  -0.01  0.00  0.00 
Partner (ref. native or no partner)       
  First-generation partner  -0.11***  0.07***  0.04*** 
  Second-generation partner  -0.02  0.02  0.00 
Visiting parents’ home country for family reasons  -0.05***  0.02**  0.02** 
       
Economic attachment and return-related factors        
Investment  -0.36***  0.11**  0.25*** 
Return migration intention  -0.01  0.00  0.00* 
Satisfaction with career:       
  Far worse than expected  -0.05  0.03  0.02 
  Worse than expected  0.00  -0.01  0.00 
Satisfaction with level of education  -0.01  0.01  0.00 
     
Pseudo R²  0.18 
*** p <  .001;  ** p <  .01;  * p <  .05 
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To  test  the  effects  of  variables  used  in  the  logistic  regression  on  the 
amount of  remittances we  applied  a logit  multinomial regression: the 
dependent variable is categorised as follow: (1) didn’t send remittances; 
(2) sent less than 500€ (3) sent 500€ or more (all categories are referred 
to  the  last  5  years).  To  interpret  regression’s  results,  we  estimated 
marginal effects. Results are presented in Table 3.  
Social and symbolic Muslims especially differ with non-Muslims 
in  remitting  small  amounts  of  remittances.  The  same  difference  was 
found between  second-generation migrants living in a  country with a 
multicultural  regime  (Netherlands  and  Sweden)  and  those  living  in  a 
country  with  a  more  exclusionist  or  assimilationist  approach. 
Furthermore, the previous finding of an increased likelihood of remitting 
among former Yugoslavs and ‘older’ migrants is mainly attributable to a 
higher proportion of people in both groups who sent a relatively large 
amount of money. The amount of remittances did not vary substantially 
with migrants’ socio-economic status and their emotional attachment to 
parents’ country of origin (including presence of close family). The only 
exception is the use of internet for obtaining information about parents’ 
home  country,  which  was  positively  linked  with  higher  amounts  of 
remittances. Finally, second-generation migrants who did invest in the 
parent’s home country and those with a return intention were particulary 
characterized by sending high amounts of money. Apparently, potential 
returnees were more likely to invest in material assets at home in order to 
prepare their return.  
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6. Conclusion and Discussion 
 
To what extent are the second-generation migrants sending remittances 
to  their  homeland?  And  what  are  the  reasons  behind  their  remitting 
behaviour: are the second-generation remitters more driven by altruism 
or by self-interest? We tried to answer these research questions in this 
study  by  examining  the  main  predicators  to  remit  among  second-
generation Turks, Moroccans and former Yugoslavs residing in several 
cities  across  Europe.  More  particular,  different  theories  on 
microeconomic determinants of remittances were tested. We built on the 
review  of  the  theoretical  debate,  analyzed  by  Rapoport  and  Docquier 
(2005), who suggest several motivations behind remitting behaviour of 
first-generation migrants, such as pure altruism, bequest and the use of 
remittances  to  obtain  a  wide  range  of  services,  and  more  intricate 
motives such as family loan repayment and insurance. 
According to our results, two types of motives seem to dominate 
the  remitting  behaviour  of  second-generation  migrants:  altruism,  i.e. 
sending money because of being emotionally attached to parent’s home 
country, and exchange motivations, i.e. remitting to those people who 
look after their investments or other material assets which are likely to be 
part of their preparation for returning. Whether the presence of these two 
types of motives implies different groups of remitters, is questionable. 
First of all, remitting is usually not driven by a single motivation but 
rather the result of a mixture of different motives. Second, being more 
likely to remit in case of strong emotional bonds is not necessarily driven 
by altruism feelings only, but could also be attributable to self-interest, 
viz.  in  order  to  strengthen  social  ties  and  to  make  it  more  easier  to 
integrate  once  back  ‘home’.  This  interpretation  is  close  to  the  return 
model stated by Lucas and Stark (1985), which seems to be overlooked 
in the theoretical literature. According to this model, remittances could 
be sent in  order  to invest in  housing,  livestock or  other assets, or  to 
enhance social prestige and strengthen the relationships with relatives 
and/or friends (social assets), in preparation of a definitive return to the 
community  of  origin.  Due  to  its  potential  relevance  to  explain  the 
motivation  behind  remittances,  also  in  case  of  second-generation   27 
migrants, we recommend future researchers to include the return model 
within the theoretical framework of the remittances’ theory.  
As  mentioned  above,  the  theoretical  models  of  remittances  are 
exclusively  developed  for  the  first-generation  migrants;  to  our 
knowledge, no previous studies have tried to test these models in the 
case  of  the  second-generation  migrants.  A  further  difficulty  with  the 
remittances models is that discriminating tests require a large number of 
variables,  as  also  Rapoport  and  Docquier  (2005)  highlighted  in  their 
conclusion.  In  the  present  paper,  however,  quite  a  large  number  of 
variables  have  been  used,  also  in  addition  to  the  conventional  ones. 
Nevertheless,  no  information  was  available  about  the  socio-economic 
status of those left behind, which would allow us to better discriminate 
between the models. Moreover, as we did not have data to whom second-
generation migrants remitted, examining the effect of “familial distance” 
was far from optimal. Hence, future efforts to develop theoretical-driven 
remittances models among second-generation migrants, containing and 
testing a broad set of factors differentiating among the models, are highly 
recommended. 
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